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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing has emerged as a popular computing paradigm
in recent years. However, today’s cloud computing architectures
often lack support for computer forensic investigations. Analyzing
various logs (e.g., process logs, network logs) plays a vital role in
computer forensics. Unfortunately, collecting logs from a cloud is
very hard given the black-box nature of clouds and the multi-tenant
cloud models, where many users share the same processing and
network resources. Researchers have proposed using log API or
cloud management console to mitigate the challenges of collecting
logs from cloud infrastructure. However, there has been no concrete
work, which shows how to provide cloud logs to investigator while
preserving users’ privacy and integrity of the logs. In this paper,
we introduce Secure-Logging-as-a-Service (SecLaaS), which stores
virtual machines’ logs and provides access to forensic investigators
ensuring the confidentiality of the cloud users. Additionally, SeclaaS
preserves proofs of past log and thus protects the integrity of the
logs from dishonest investigators or cloud providers. Finally, we
evaluate the feasibility of the scheme by implementing SecLaaS for
network access logs in OpenStack – a popular open source cloud
platform.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.4 [Computer Communication Networks]: Distributed Sys-
tems—Cloud Computing; K.6.m [Management of Computing
and Information Systems]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Cloud Forensics, Forensic Investigation, Cloud Security, Logging-
as-a-Service
1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing offers infinite infrastructure resources, very
convenient pay-as-you-go service, and low cost computing. As
a result, cloud computing has become one of the most dominant
computing paradigms in recent years. Today, small and high level
companies are attracted to cloud computing because it does not
require any kind of local infrastructure setup, and, at the same
time, it is highly cost effective. According to Khajeh-hossainei,
an organization can save 37% of its cost just by moving their IT
infrastructure from an outsourced data center to Amazon’s cloud
[17]. Market Research Media stated in one of their recent reports
that the cloud computing market is expected to grow at a 30%
compound annual growth rate and will reach $270 billion in 2020
[20]. Garner Inc. states that the strong growth of cloud computing
will bring $148.8 billion revenue by 2014 [12]. From the research
work of INPUT, it is clear that Cloud computing is equally popular
in both Government and private industry; their report identifies that
the federal cloud market is expected to expand to $800 million by
2013 [15].
Cloud computing opens a new horizon of computing for business
and IT organizations. However, at the same time, malicious indi-
viduals can easily exploit the power of cloud computing. Attackers
can attack applications running inside the cloud. Alternatively, they
can launch attacks from machines inside the cloud. These issues
are the primary concerns of Cloud Forensics. An annual report of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) states that, the size of the
average digital forensic case is growing 35% per year in the United
States. From 2003 to 2007, it increased from 83GB to 277 GB
[11]. As a result, forensic experts are devising new techniques for
digital forensics. There are several forensics analysis schemes and
tools available in market. Unfortunately, none of them are suitable
for the dynamic nature of cloud computing. Many of the implicit
assumptions made in regular forensics analysis (e.g., physical access
to hardware) are not valid for cloud computing. Hence, for cloud
infrastructure, a special branch of digital forensics has been brought
up by researchers - Cloud Forensics. Cloud forensics offers new
challenges and has opened new research problems for security and
forensics experts, which are important from both technical and legal
point of view.
The process of digital forensics starts with acquiring the digital
evidence. In a cloud, the evidence could be the image of virtual
machines, files stored in cloud storage, and logs provided by cloud
service providers (CSP). However, collecting these evidences, spe-
cially logs from cloud infrastructure, is extremely difficult because
cloud users or investigators have very little control over the infras-
tructure. Currently, to collect logs from cloud, investigators are
dependent on the CSP. Investigators need to issue a subpoena to the
CSP to acquire the logs of a particular user. However, they need
to believe the CSPs blindly, as there is no way to verify whether
the CSPs are providing valid logs or not. Moreover, if an adversary
shuts down the virtual machine (VM) she is using, there is no way
to collect logs from the terminated VM.
To overcome the challenges of acquiring logs from cloud infras-
tructure, Bark et al. proposed that the CSPs can provide network,
process and access logs to customer by a read-only API [5]. To solve
the same problem, Dykstra et al. recommended a cloud management
plane for using in Infrastructure-as-a-Service model [10]. However,
they did not show how we can practically implement those schemes.
Additionally, log information is highly sensitive and user’s privacy
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issues are directly related to it. Previous studies do not provide a
secure way of revealing the logs while maintaining user privacy.
Moreover, it is vital to ensure that logs are not tampered with before
exposing to investigators. For a successful forensic scheme based
on logs, these issues must be resolved in a secure and trustworthy
manner.
In this paper, we take the first step towards exposing a publicly
available secure log service. This service can be used by forensic
investigators to identify malicious activities that took place in virtual
machines of a cloud system.
To illustrate the specific problem we look at, we present the
following hypothetical scenario:
Alice is a successful businesswoman who runs a shopping website
in cloud. The site serves a number of customers every day and
her organization generates a significant amount of profit from it.
Therefore, if the site is down even for a few minutes, it will seriously
hamper not only their profit but also the goodwill. Mallory, a
malicious attacker decided to attack Alice’s shopping website. She
rented some machines in cloud and launched a Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attack to the shopping website using those rented
machines. As a result, the site was down for an hour, which had
quite negative impact on Alice’s business. Consequently, Alice asked
a forensic investigator to investigate the case. The investigator
found that Alice’s website records the visiting customer’s IP address.
Analyzing the visiting customers records, the investigator found that
Alice’s website was flooded by some IP addresses which are owned
by a cloud service provider. Eventually, the investigator issued a
subpoena to the corresponding cloud provider to provide him the
network logs for those particular IP addresses. On the other hand,
Mallory managed to collude with the cloud provider after the attack.
Therefore, while providing the logs to the investigator, the cloud
provider supplied tampered log to the investigator, who had no
way to verify the correctness of the logs. Under this circumstance,
Mallory will remain undetected. Even if the cloud provider was
honest, Mallory could terminate her rented machines and left no
traces of the attack. Hence, the cloud provider could not give any
useful logs to the investigator.
To mitigate the challenges discussed in the above scenario, we
propose the notion of Secure-Logging-as-a-Service (SecLaaS) in
this paper.
Contributions: The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We propose a scheme of revealing cloud users’ logs for foren-
sics investigation while preserving the confidentiality of users’
logs from malicious cloud employee or external entity;
2. We introduce Proof of Past Log (PPL) – a tamper evident
scheme to prevent the cloud service provider or investigators
from manipulating the logs after-the-fact.
3. We evaluate the proposed scheme using a open source cloud
computing platform.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides some background information and challenges of
cloud forensics in terms of logging. Section 3 describes the ad-
versary’s capabilities and possible attacks on logging-as-a-service.
Section 4 presents our SecLaaS scheme and Section 5 provides
security analysis of the scheme. In Section 6, we provide the imple-
mentation and performance evaluation of our scheme on an open
source cloud software, OpenStack. Section 7 discusses the usability
of our proposed schemes. In Section 8, we provide an overview of
related research about logging in cloud forensics, and finally, we
conclude in Section 9.
2. BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
With the increasing popularity of cloud computing, there is a
significant interest in the law-enforcement community to extend
digital forensics techniques in the context of a cloud. In this section,
we present the definitions of digital forensics and cloud forensics,
motivation behind our work, and discuss the challenges of logging-
as-a-service for cloud forensics.
2.1 Digital Forensics
Digital forensics is the process of preserving, collecting, confirm-
ing, identifying, analyzing, recording, and presenting crime scene
information. Wolfe defines digital forensics as “A methodical series
of techniques and procedures for gathering evidence, from comput-
ing equipment and various storage devices and digital media, that
can be presented in a court of law in a coherent and meaningful
format" [30]. According to a definition by NIST [16], computer
forensics is an applied science to identify an incident, collection,
examination, and analysis of evidence data. While doing so, main-
taining the integrity of the information and strict chain of custody
for the data is mandatory. Several other researchers define com-
puter forensics as the procedure of examining computer system to
determine potential legal evidence [18, 24].
2.2 Cloud Forensics
Cloud forensics can be defined as applying computer forensics
procedures in a cloud computing environment. As cloud computing
is based on extensive network access, and as network forensics
handles forensic investigation in private and public network, Ruan
et al. defined cloud forensics as a subset of network forensics [25].
They also identified three dimensions in cloud forensics – technical,
organizational, and legal. Cloud forensics procedures will vary
according to the service and deployment model of cloud computing.
For Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) and Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS),
we have very limited control over process or network monitoring.
Whereas, we can gain more control in Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(IaaS) and can deploy some forensic friendly logging mechanism.
The first three steps of computer forensics, identification, collection,
and organization of evidence will vary for different service and
deployment model. For example, the evidence collection procedure
of SaaS and IaaS will not be same. For SaaS, we solely depend on
the CSP to get the application log, while in IaaS, we can acquire
the virtual machine image from the customer and can enter into
examination and analysis phase. On the other hand, in the private
deployment model, we have physical access to the digital evidence,
but we merely can get physical access to public deployment model.
2.3 Motivation
Though cloud computing offers numerous opportunities to differ-
ent level of consumers, many security issues of cloud environment
have not been resolved yet. According to a recent IDCI survey, 74%
of IT executives and CIO’s referred to security as the main reason to
prevent their migration to the cloud services model [8]. Some recent
and well-publicized attacks on cloud computing platform justify the
concern with security. For example, a botnet attack on Amazon’s
cloud infrastructure was reported in 2009 [2].
Besides attacking cloud infrastructure, adversaries can use the
cloud to launch attack on other systems. For example, an adversary
can rent hundreds of virtual machines to launch a Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attack. After a successful attack, she can erase
all the traces of the attack by turning off the virtual machines. A
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criminal can also keep her secret files (e.g., child pornography,
terrorist documents) in cloud storage and can destroy all her local
evidence to remain clean. When law enforcement investigates such
a suspect, the suspect can deny launching a DDoS attack. At present,
there is no way to claim that an adversary access a certain network
at a given time.
Researchers are working to protect the cloud environment from
different types of attacks. However, in case of an attack, we also
need to investigate the incident, i.e., we need to carry out a digital
forensic investigation in the cloud. Besides protecting the cloud,
we need to focus on this issue. Unfortunately, there has been little
research on adapting digital forensics for use in cloud environments.
In this paper, we address this problem, which has significant real-
life implications in law enforcement investigating cybercrime and
terrorism.
2.4 Challenges
Analyzing logs from different processes plays a vital role in
digital forensic investigation. Process logs, network logs, and appli-
cation logs are really useful to identify a malicious user. However,
gathering this crucial information in cloud environment is not as
simple as it is in privately owned computer system, sometimes even
impossible. The inherent characteristics of cloud have made the
forensic log-analysis a nightmare for the forensic investigators. It is
very difficult to collect and prove the validity of the logs to the court
authority. For example, how can an investigator collect network
logs of malicious VMs, which have been already terminated by the
attacker after launching a DDoS attack last month? We must find
secure techniques for storing and providing logs to investigators,
which also need to be admissible in a court of law as valid evidence.
Many things can complicate the log collection process. A malicious
CSP can change the logs while providing the logs to investigators.
Clients may question the integrity of any such logs, claiming that the
forensic investigators or the prosecution and the CSP have colluded
to plant evidence in the cloud. The following reasons also make
the log collection and providing the proof of the logs challenging in
cloud.
Reduced Level of Control, and Dependence on the CSP: One of
the challenges of collecting logs securely from cloud is the users’ or
investigators’ reduced level of control over the cloud environment.
In traditional computer forensics, the investigators have full control
over the evidence (e.g., router logs, process logs, hard disk). Cur-
rently, to acquire the logs, we extensively depend on the CSPs. The
availability of the logs varies depending on the service model. Fig-
ure 1 shows the control of customers in different layers for the three
different service models – IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS. From the figure,
we can observe that cloud users have highest control in IaaS and
least control in SaaS. This physical inaccessibility of the evidence
and lack of control over the system make evidence acquisition a
challenging task in cloud forensics. In SaaS, customers do no get
any log of their system, unless the CSP provides the logs. In PaaS,
it is only possible to get the application log from the customers.
To get the network log, database log, or operating system log we
need to depend on the CSP. For example, Amazon does not provide
load balancer log to the customers [3]. In a recent research work,
Marty mentioned that he was unable to get MySql log data from
Amazon’s Relational Database Service [21]. In IaaS, customers do
not have the network or process logs. Several other problems come
along with the less control issue. For example, we need to depend
on the cloud service providers for evidence acquisition, which in
turn brings the honesty issue of the CSP’s employee, who is not
a certified forensic investigator. CSPs can always tamper the logs
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Figure 1: Customers’ control over different layers in different ser-
vice model
as they have the full control over the generated logs. Additionally,
CSPs are not always obligated to provide all the necessary logs.
Decentralization. In cloud infrastructure, log information is not
located at any single centralized log server; rather logs are decen-
tralized among several servers. Multiple users’ log information may
be co-located or spread across multiple servers. Moreover, there are
several layers and tiers in cloud architecture. Logs are generated
in each tier. For example, application, network, operating system,
and database – all of these layers produce valuable logs for forensic
investigation. Collecting logs from these multiple servers and layers
and providing it to investigators in a secure way is extremely chal-
lenging.
Accessibility of Logs. The logs generated in different layers are
required to be accessible to different stakeholders of the system, e.g.,
system administrator, forensic investigator, and developer. System
administrators need relevant log to troubleshoot the system; devel-
opers need the required log to fix the bug of the application; forensic
investigators need logs, which can help in their investigation. Hence,
there should be some access control mechanism, so that everybody
will get what they need exactly – nothing more, nothing less and
obviously, in a secure way. We should not expect that a malicious
cloud employee, who can violate the privacy of the users gets access
to users’ log information.
Multi-tenancy: In cloud computing, multiple virtual machines
(VM) can share the same physical infrastructure, i.e., log for multi-
ple customers may be co-located. The nature of this infrastructure is
different from the traditional single owner computer system. Hence,
while collecting logs for one user, other users’ data can be mingled
with the log evidence. An alleged user can claim that the log con-
tains information of other users, not her. The investigator then needs
to prove it to the court that the provided logs indeed belongs to the
malicious user. Moreover, we need to preserve the privacy of the
other tenants. For both of these issues, collecting and providing logs
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to the investigator is challenging in cloud paradigm.
Chain of custody: The chain of custody is one of the most vital
issues in traditional digital forensic investigation. The chain of cus-
tody should clearly depict how the evidence was collected, analyzed,
and preserved in order to be presented as admissible evidence in
court [29]. In traditional forensic procedure, it starts with gaining
the physical control of the evidence, e.g., computer, hard disk. How-
ever, in cloud forensics, this step is not possible due to the multi
jurisdictional laws, procedures, and proprietary technology in cloud
environment [27, 14]. Collecting logs from cloud infrastructure,
analyzing, and presenting the proof of logs need to follow this chain
of custody. We must clarify certain things to maintain the chain of
custody, e.g., how the logs were generated and stored, and who had
the access to the logs.
Presentation: The final step of digital forensic investigation is
presentation, where an investigator accumulates his findings and
presents to the court as the evidence of a case. Challenges also
lie in this step of cloud forensics [22]. Proving the integrity of
network and process logs in front of jury for traditional computer
forensics is relatively easy, compared to the complex structure of
cloud computing. Presenting the logs and the proofs of integrity of
the logs to the court in an admissible way is challenging for cloud
computing.
3. THREAT MODEL
In this section, we describe the attacker’s capability, possible
attacks on logs, and properties of our proposed system. Before
describing the threat model, we first define the important terms to
clarify the threat model.
3.1 Definition of terms
• User: A user is a customer of the cloud service provider
(CSP), who uses the CSP’s storage service. A user can be
malicious or honest.
• Log: A log can be the network log, process log, operating
system logs, or any other logs generated in cloud for a VM.
• Proof of Past Logs (PPL): The PPL contains the proof of logs
to verify whether some logs belong to a particular user or not.
• Investigator: An investigator is a professional forensic in-
vestigator, who needs to collect necessary logs from cloud
infrastructure in case of any malicious incident.
• CSP: The Cloud Service Provider (CSP) will generate the
PPL and give access to the logs to users and investigators
through an API or management console.
• Log Chain (LC): The LC maintains the correct order of the
logs. From the LC, it can be verified that the CSP or the
investigators provide logs in the actual order of log generation.
• Auditor: Most likely, the auditor will be the court authority
that will verify the correctness of the logs from the PPL and
LC.
• Intruder: An intruder can be any malicious person including
a employee of the CSP, who wants to reveal user’s activity
from the PPL or from the log storage.
3.2 Attacker’s Capability
In our threat model, we assume that the users and the investigators
do not trust the CSPs, and both of them can be malicious. We
assume that a CSP is honest at the time of publishing the PPL and
LC. However, during the investigation, CSP can collude with a user
or an investigator and provide tampered logs, for which the PPL and
LC have already been published. User, investigator, and CSP can
collude with each other to provide fake logs to the auditor. A user
cannot modify the logs by him, but he can collude with CSP to alter
the logs. An investigator can present false log information to the
court to frame an honest user or can collude with a malicious user to
save her from accusation. The CSP can also repudiate any published
PPL. An intruder can acquire the PPL of a user to learn the user’s
activity. A malicious cloud employee can also be an intruder.
3.3 Possible Attacks
There can be different types of attacks on providing log API. CSP
can remove some crucial logs or can reorder the logs. A user can
deny the ownership of any logs. Even an investigator can present
invalid logs to the court. Below we mention some of the possible
attacks:
• Privacy violation: If the CSP published the PPL publicly on
the web, any malicious person can acquire the published PPL
and try to learn about the logs from the proof. Even if logs are
kept unpublished, an otherwise honest employee of the CSP
who has access to the log storage can identify the activity of
the user from the stored logs.
• Log modification: A dishonest CSP, while colluding with
user or investigator can modify the logs, either to save a
malicious user or to frame a honest user. If an investigator
is not trustworthy, he can also tamper with the logs before
presenting the logs to the court. There can be three types of
contamination of logs:
1. Removal of crucial logs
2. Planting of false logs
3. Modification of the order of the logs
• Repudiation by CSP: An otherwise honest CSP can deny a
published PPL/LC after-the-fact.
• Repudiation by User: As data are co-mingled in the cloud, a
malicious user can claim that the logs contain another cloud
user’s data.
3.4 System Property
In designing SecLaaS, our goal is to ensure the secure preserva-
tion of cloud users’ logs in a persistent storage. Our mechanism
should prevent any malicious party to produce a false proof of past
logs PPL. A false PPL attests the presence of a log record for a
user, which the user does not actually own. Once the proof has been
published, the CSP can neither modify the proof nor repudiate any
published proof. Additionally, we must prevent false implications
by malicious forensic investigators. Based on our analysis, a secure
log service for clouds should possess the following integrity and
confidentiality properties:
• I1: The CSP cannot remove a log entry from the storage after
publishing the PPL.
• I2: The CSP cannot change the order of a log from its actual
order of generation.
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• I3: The CSP cannot plant false log after-the-fact.
• I4: An investigator cannot hide or remove a log entry at the
time of presenting logs to court.
• I5: An investigator cannot change the actual order of a log
entry at the time of presenting evidences to court.
• I6: An Investigator cannot present phony log to the court.
• I7: The CSP cannot repudiate any previously published proof
of logs.
• C1: From the published proof of log, no adversaries can
recover any log.
• C2: A malicious cloud employee will not be able to recover
logs from the log storage.
4. THE SecLaaS SCHEME
In this section, we present SecLaaS – our system for secure
retrieval of logs and storage of the proof of past logs. Initially, we
provide an overview of the mechanism, followed by the schematic
and the protocol specific description of the system.
4.1 Overview
A VM in the cloud can attack other VMs inside the cloud or can
attack a computing device outside the VM. The attacker VM can
also attack the Node Controller (NC) to launch a side channel attack
[23]. Figure 2 presents an overview of storing the logs in a secured
way and making it available to forensic investigators in case of such
attacks. Malicious activity of a VM can be found from various logs
generated in the NC, on which the VM is running. For each running
VM, our system first extracts various kinds of logs from the NC and
will store in a persistent log database. Hence, terminating the VM
will not prevent SecLaaS to provide useful logs during investigation.
While saving logs in log database, SecLaaS ensures the integrity
and confidentiality of the logs. After saving a log entry in the log
database, the system will additionally store the proof of this entry in
the proof database. When an investigator wants logs of a particular
IP to investigate an incident, he can get the necessary logs by an
API call or from the cloud management plane. In order to prove the
logs as admissible evidence, the investigator can provide the proof
of the logs along with the logs.
4.2 Schematic Description
In this section, we present the schematic description of our system.
SecLaaS extracts log information from different log sources and
generates a Log Entry LE. A Log Entry LE for network log is defined
as follows:
LE =< FromIP, ToIP, T L, Port, UserId > (1)
To ensure the confidentiality of users’ log, some information of the
LE can be encrypted using a common public key of the security
agencies. The Encrypted Log Entry ELE is prepared as follows:
ELE =< EPKa (ToIP, Port, UserId), F romIP, T L > (2)
where PKa is the common public key of all the agencies. We cannot
encrypt all the fields of the LE as the CSP needs to search the storage
by some fields. To preserve the correct order of the log entry, we
will use a hash-chain scheme. We refer the hash-chain as Log Chain
(LC), which will be generated as follows:
LC =< H(ELE,LCPrev) > (3)
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Figure 2: Overview of SecLaaS
where LCPrev is the Log Chain LC of the previous entry of the
persistent storage. Each entry for the persistent log database DBLE
is constituted of ELE and LC,
DBLE =< ELE,LC > (4)
The proof of this DBLE will be inserted into a accumulator. We
denote this as Accumulator Entry AE. At the end of each day, CSP
retrieves the AED of that day and generates the Proof of Past Log
PPL as follows:
PPL =< H(AED), SPKc(AED), t > (5)
where H(AE) is the hash of AE, t represents the proof generation
time, and SPKc(AE) is the signature over AE using the private key of
the CSP, PKc.
4.3 System Details
In this section, we present how the log insertion, proof generation,
and verification of SecLaaS work. We consider the network log to
describe the entire system. After generating the Log Entry LE the
system will work for any type of logs.
4.3.1 Log and Proof Insertion
Figure 3 illustrates the detail flow of log retrieval, secured log
insertion, and PPL generation and below is the details of the system.
(a) The parser module first communicates with the log sources to
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Figure 3: Process Flow of Retrieving Log and Storing the PPL
collects different types of logs. For example, to store network
log the parser listens the Snort 1.
(b) After acquiring logs from different sources, the parser then
parses the collected log and generates the Log Entry LE.
(c) The parser module sends the Log Entry LE to the logger
module to further process the LE.
(d) The logger module, upon receiving the LE from the parser,
encrypts some confidential information using the public key
of the security agencies and generates the Encrypted Log
Entry ELE. The private key to decrypt the log can be shared
among the security agencies. For the network log, some
crucial information that we can encrypt includes: destination
IP, port, and user information.
(e) After generating the ELE, the logger module then creates the
Log Chain LC by using equation 3. In section 5, we will
discuss how this can prevent reordering and deletion of logs.
(f) The logger module then prepares the entry for the log storage
DBLE using the Encrypted Log Entry ELE and the Log Chain
LC, and sends the DBLE to the log storage to add the new
entry.
(g) After creating the database entry DBLE, the logger module
communicates with the proof storage to retrieve the latest
accumulator entry.
9 1http://www.snort.org
(h) In this step, the logger generates the proof of the database
entry DBLE, i.e., the logger creates a new entry for the accu-
mulator AE and updates the last retrieved accumulator entry
with the newly generated AE.
(i) The logger module sends the updated accumulator entry to
the accumulator storage to store the proof.
(j) At the end of each day, the logger retrieves the last accumula-
tor entry of each static IP, which we denote as AED.
(k) According to equation 5, the logger then creates the Proof of
Past Log PPL using the AED.
(l) After computing the Proof of Past Log PPL, the logger will
publish the PPL and the public key of CSP on the web. These
information can also be available by RSS feed to protect it
from manipulation by the CSP after publishing the proof.
We can also build a trust model by engaging other CSPs in
the proof publication process. Whenever one CSP publishes
a PPL, that PPL will also be shared between other CSPs.
Therefore, we can get a valid proof as long as one CSP is
honest.
4.3.2 Verification
When an investigator wants to investigate an incident, he will first
gather the required log either by calling log API or from the cloud
management console. While presenting the evidence to the court,
he needs to provide the collected logs and also the proof of the logs.
There will be two steps to verify the provided logs. In the first step,
the auditor will verify the integrity of the proof and the individual
log entry. In the next step, he will verify the order of the log.
Integrity Verification: Figure 4 shows the the process flow of
individual log entry verification.
Published Proof (PPL)	

Result from API Call	

DBLE- 0	
Exists?	
No	

Sequence verification	

Yes	

Reject	

DBLE- 1	

Valid?	
No	
Reject	

AED	

AE	

Figure 4: Log Verification Process Flow
The verification process starts from checking the validity of the
published Proof of Past Log PPL. To do so, first, the auditor decrypts
the SPKc(AED) using the public key of the CSP and he will get the
AED. Then the auditor generates the hash value from the dycrypted
6
AED. If the generated hash and the H(AED) of the PPL matches,
then the auditor accepts the PPL as a valid proof of log, otherwise
he rejects the verification process.
In the next step, the auditor generates the Accumulator Entry
AE for each DBLE. Then, he will check whether the calculated AE
exists in the AED. If exists, then the auditor proceeds towards log
order verification process, otherwise he rejects the provided log
information.
Sequence Verification: Figure 5 illustrates the log order verifica-
tion process, where we verify whether the current log (DBLE1) is
actually after the previous log (DBLE0) in the original sequence
of log generation. In the figure 5, ELE0 denotes the Encrypted
Log Entry ELE of the first log and ELE1 represents the same for
the second log. To verify the correct order, the auditor calculates
the Log Chain LCa from the first Log Chain LC0 and the second
Encrypted Log ELE1 according to the following equation.
LCa =< H(ELE1, LC0) > (6)
If LCa matches with the 2nd Log Chain LC1 then the auditor accepts
the logs, otherwise he rejects it.
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 LC0	

Reject	
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Figure 5: Log Order Verification Process Flow
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As CSPs have control over generating the logs and the proofs,
they can always tamper with the logs. After acquiring logs through
API or management console, investigators can also alter the logs
before presenting it to court. Therefore, here we propose a tamper
evident scheme. Any violation of the integrity and confidentiality
properties, as mentioned in Section 3 can be detected during the
verification process.
In our collusion model, there are three entities involved – CSP,
user, and investigator. All of them can be malicious individually
or can collude with each other. We denote an honest CSP as C,
a dishonest CSP as C¯, an honest user as U, a dishonest user as
U¯ , an honest investigator as I, and a dishonest investigator as I¯ .
Hence, there can be total eight possible combinations of collusion.
Table 1 presents all the combinations of collusion, possible attacks
for each collusion, and required security properties to defend that
collusion. Here, we discuss how our proposed system can ensure
all the security properties, which are required to protect collusion
between CSP, user, and investigator.
• I1, I2, I4, I5: A CSP can collude with the cloud user or the
investigator and can remove crucial log information. Also,
while providing logs through the API or the management con-
sole, the CSP can simply hide some crucial log entries. An
Investigator can also hide logs before at the time of present-
ing evidence to court, though he have received correct logs
through the log API. However, at the verification stage, our
system can detect any such removal of log entries. Let us
assume that there are three log entries DBLE0, DBLE1, and
DBLE2 and their proof has already been published. Now, if
CSP removes DBLE1 and provides only DBLE0 and DBLE2
to the investigator, then this removal can be easily detected
at the sequence verification stage. In this case, the hash of
LC0 and ELE2 will not match with the LC2 because the orig-
inal LC2 was calculated by hashing LC1 and ELE2. In the
same way, an auditor can detect the re-ordering of logs. For
example, while providing the logs to an auditor, if the CSP
or investigator provides the log in DBLE0, DBLE2, DBLE1
order, then using the same technique, the auditor can identify
that DBLE2 does not come after DBLE0 in actual generation
order. A CSP can further try to change the DBLE2 by replac-
ing the original LC2 with a new Log Chain value so that, in
the sequence verification process, the order breaking will not
be detected. However, an attempt of changing the DBLE2
will be detected during the individual log entry verification
phase. The accumulator entry of the fake DBLE2 will not
exist in the published Proof of Past Log PPL.
• I3, I6: A colluding CSP can plant false log information while
providing the log to the investigator. However, if the CSP
does this after publishing the proof, our system can detect
these phony logs. A dishonest investigator can also try to
frame an honest user by presenting fake logs to the court.
Suppose, DBLEF is the fake log and the auditor generates the
Accumulator Entry AEF for this log. If it’s fake, then AEF
will not be present in the AED of the Proof of Past Log PPL
and the auditor can reject that incorrect log.
• I7: After publishing the proof of past log PPL, CSP cannot
repudiate the published proof as the accumulator entry AED is
signed by CSP’s private key. Nobody other than the CSP can
use that private key to sign the AED. Hence, after decrypting
the signed value and generating hash on the decrypted value,
if it matches with the hashed AED value, the CSP cannot
repudiate the published value. Additionally, if the CSP comes
up with a false PPLf in place of a published PPL, then it will
be easily detected. In that case, the H(AED) of the published
PPL and the H(AEDf) of the false PPLf will not be same. As
the CSP has already signed the AED of the published PPL
using its private key, it cannot deny the published value.
• C1, C2: To store the proof of the logs, we propose to use an
accumulator function, which will ensure the C1 property, i.e.,
from the proof of logs, adversaries cannot recover any log.
We implement our scheme using Bloom filter and One-Way
Accumulator, which can ensure this property. While storing
the log data in persistent storage, we propose to encrypt some
crucial information e.g., user id, destination IP, etc by using a
common public key of all the investigator agencies. Hence, a
malicious cloud employee cannot retrieve plain log informa-
tion from the persistent storage; e.g., identifying the visiting
IPs of a particular user will not be possible by the malicious
cloud employee. In this way, our scheme can ensure the C2
property.
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Is Honest? Notation Attack Required Security
Properties
CSP User Investigator
3 3 3 C U I No attack None
5 3 3 C¯ U I Reveal user activity from logs C2
3 5 3 C U¯ I Recover other cloud users’ log from published proof C1
3 3 5 C U I¯ Remove, reorder, and plant fake logs I4, I5, I6
3 5 5 C U¯ I¯ Remove, reorder, and plant fake logs I4, I5, I6
5 3 5 C¯ U I¯ Remove, reorder, plant fake logs, and repudiate published PPL I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, I6, I7
5 5 3 C¯U¯ I Remove, reorder, plant fake logs, and repudiate published PPL I1, I2, I3, I7
5 5 5 C¯U¯ I¯ Remove, reorder, plant fake logs, and repudiate published PPL I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, I6, I7
Table 1: Collusion model, possible attacks and required security properties
6. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we present the implementation of SecLaaS on
OpenStack and performance analysis of the scheme using different
types of accumulators.
6.1 Implementation
System Setup: We used Openstack1 and Snort for testing and im-
plementation of our project. OpenStack is an open source cloud
computing software and Snort is a free lightweight network intrusion
detection system. We created the virtual environments with Virtu-
alBox (a free virtualization software)2 running on a single Ubuntu
machine. Figure 6 illustrates the system setup and below is the
description of the system:
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Figure 6: Prototype Environment Configuration
[28]
• Host machine’s hardware configuration: Intel Core I7 quad
core CPU, 16 GB ram and 750 GB hard drive. Ubuntu 12.04
LTS 64-bit is used as Host Operating System.
• VirtualBox 4.1.22 r80657 for Ubuntu 12.04 LTS
• Openstack (Essex release, came out by the end of April 2012)
installation in VirtualBox; for simplicity, the system had one
node controller. Configuration of vitualized cloud controller:
9 1http://www.openstack.org
9 2https://www.virtualbox.org
Intel 2.5Ghz Dual Core cpu, 8 GB ram and 20 GB hard drive.
Ubuntu 12.04 64-bit Sever edition is used as the Operating
system for Openstack setup.
• In the virtualized environment, the Cloud Controller required
following network adapter configuration in VirtualBox to
work properly:
– Adapter 1: Attached to NAT- eth0 of the Cloud con-
troller is connected here.
– Adapter 2: Host-only network for Public interface- con-
nected with eth1 (IP was set to 172.16.0.254, mask 255.
255.0.0, dhcp disbaled)
– Adapter 3: Host-only network for Private (VLAN) in-
terface connected with eth2 (IP to 11.0.0.1, mask 255.
0.0.0, dhcp disbaled)
• We used RSA (2048 bit) for signature generation and SHA-
2(SHA-256) hash function for hashing.
We set up Snort in node controller to track the network activity of
the virtual machines. We added two virtual machines: the first one
had private IP: 11.1.0.3 and public IP: 172.16.1.1; while the other
had private IP: 11.1.0.5 and public IP: 172.16.1.3. Here is a sample
Snort log:
“11/19-13:43:43.222391 11.1.0.5:51215 -> 74.125.130.106:80
TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:22101 IpLen:20 DgmLen:40 DF
***A***F Seq: 0x3EA405D9 Ack: 0x89DE7D Win: 0x7210
TcpLen: 20”
This log tells that the virtual machine with private IP 11.1.0.5
performed a http request to machine 74.125.130.160. By reverse
engineering Openstack’s “nova” mysql database, it is also possible
to find out the static private IP and user information from a public IP.
We used the references among FloatingIps, FixedIps and Instances
tables to resolve the user id for a particular log entry. Figure 7 shows
the relation between these three tables.
We implemented the Proof of Past Log PPL scheme of the Se-
cLaaS using two accumulators. One is BloomFilter [6] and another
is One-Way Accumulator [?]. The steps from (g) to (k) will work
differently for the two accumulators.
BloomFilter: A Bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure with
no false negatives rate, which is used to check whether an element
is a member of a set or not [6]. Bloom filter stores the membership
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Figure 7: Resolving User ID from Public IP
information in a bit array. Bloom filters decrease the element inser-
tion time and membership checking time. The only drawback of the
Bloom filter is the probability of finding false positives. However,
we can decrease the false positive probability by using a large bit
array.
To use the Bloom filter as a proof, we use one bloom filter for
one static IP for each day. That means, one Bloom filter stores the
proof of all the logs of one static IP for a particular day. In step (g),
the logger retrieves the bloom filter from the proof storage, which
holds the bit positions for the previously inserted logs of the day.
In step (h), while creating the accumulator entry AE, the logger
will generate the k number of bit positions for the database entry
DBLE by hashing the log for k times. Then, the logger updates
the previously retrieved Bloom filter with the newly generated AE
and sends the updated Bloom filter to the proof storage. At the end
of each day, the CSP will retrieve the Bloom filter entry of each
static IP AED and create the proof of past log PPL for that day using
equation 5.
In the verification phase, after verifying the validity of the pub-
lished proof, the auditor will hash the log entry that he has received
from the API call and calculate the bit positions of the Bloom filter.
Then he will compare these bit positions with the published AED. If
all the calculated bit positions are set in the published Bloom filter
AED, then the verifier will be sure about the validity of the log. One
single false bit position means the log entry is not valid.
One-Way Accumulator: A One-Way accumulator is a crypto-
graphic accumulator, which is based on RSA assumption and pro-
vides the functionality of checking the membership of an element
in a set [4]. This scheme works with zero false negative and false
positive probability. Initially, we create the public and private values
for the accumulator. The private values are two large prime numbers
P and Q. The first public value is N, where N = P*Q and the second
public value is a large random number which is the initial seed X.
In step (g), the logger retrieves the accumulator entry AE. If there
is no proof entry, i.e., the AE is empty for an IP on a day, then the
AE of the first DBLE of the day is generated using the following
equation
AE = XH(DBLE)modN (7)
where H(DBLE) is a numeric hash value of DBLE. If the retrieved AE
is not empty, then the new AE will be generated using the following
equation
AE = AEH(DBLE)modN (8)
The logger module then sends the calculate AE to the proof storage.
At the end of the day, the logger retrieves the last accumulator
entry AED and creates the proof of past log PPL for the day using
equation 5. The logger needs to do some additional computation
here comparing with the Bloom filter. It will generate an identity
for each DBLE and tagged it with the DBLE. If there are k number
of DBLE on a day then the identity ID of the ith DBLE will be
calculated using the following equation
ID = XH(DBLE1) H(DBLE2)... H(DBLEi-1) H(DBLEi+1)....H(DBLEk) (9)
While verifying the validity of the DBLEi, the verifier computes
IDH(DBLEi)mod N and compares it with AED. If AED = IDH(DBLEi)mod
N, then the verifier will be sure about the validity of the log.
6.2 Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our scheme we ran our experi-
ment using multiple accumulators. For Bloom filter, we used two
configurations: 1% false positive (FP) probability with 5000 items,
and 2% FP with 10000 items. Then, for One-Way accumulator, we
choose 32-bit and 64-bit P,Q, and X.
Figure 8 shows the performance analysis of log insertion includ-
ing generating and updating the proof of log, i.e., the time required
to complete the steps from (b) to (i) of the Figure 3. We found that
for all the accumulators, time increases linearly with the increase of
log size. For the two Bloom filter configurations, we noticed nearly
similar time. However, we found a significant amount of increase in
time when changed the one-way accumulator from 32-bit to 64-bit.
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Figure 8: Performance Analysis of Log Insertion Using Different
Accumulators
Figure 9 illustrates the performance analysis of generating the
Proof of Past Log of a day for different accumulators, i.e., the time
required to complete the steps from (j) to (l) of the figure 3. For
the two different Bloom filters, we found nearly constant amount
of time. On the contrary, for the One-Way accumulators, we found
a linear increase in time for different sizes of logs. It is obvious,
because in the later case, we need to compute the identity of each
log entry using the equation 9 which has O(n) time complexity. [13].
Figure 10 presents the time for verifying the validity of each log.
For all of the accumulators, we found nearly constant amount of
time with the increase in log size. However, the time required for
32-bit accumulator is higher than the Bloom filters and for 64-bit
accumulator the time is significantly higher than its counterparts.
To identify the performance degradation of NC for storing log,
we first run a RSA encryption on a 16 MB file for several times and
measure the average execution time without running the snort logger
in NC. At that time, two VMs were running on that NC. Then we
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Figure 9: Performance Analysis of PPL Generation Using Different
Accumulators
start the snort service and again measure the average execution time
of encryption on the same data. From these two execution times we
measured the performance overhead, which is only 1.6%.
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Figure 10: Performance Analysis of Log Verification Using Differ-
ent Accumulators
7. DISCUSSION
Our experimental result shows that the Bloom filter outperforms
the One-Way accumulator for all the tasks: log insertion, PPL gener-
ation, and log verification. However, Bloom filter is a probabilistic
accumulator, which can state about the existence of a log in the PPL
with certain probability. It works with zero false negative probabil-
ity though. On the other hand, One-Way accumulator works with
zero false positive probability. This means, in Bloom filter there
is still some chance of planting false log information by the CSP
or the investigator, which is not possible in One-Way accumulator.
The later one always finds a valid log entry with zero false positive
probability. However, we can decrease the false positive probability
of the Bloom filter by allocating more space to the bit array. For
example, to ensure 1% FP for 10,000 elements we need 91133 bits
or 11.12 KBytes storage and to ensure 0.1% FP for the same number
of elements we need 111945 bits or 13.67 KBytes storage. In our
scheme we use one Bloom filter for one static IP for each day. If we
have n number of static IP then for 0.1% FP and 10,000 logs we will
require n * 13.67 KBytes storage each day and n*4989.55 KBytes
in one year.
For the One-Way accumulator, proof requires a very small amount
of storage. The 32-bit accumulator requires 19 Bytes for the final
accumulator entry, whereas, the 64-bit requires 39 Bytes. However,
to complete the verification in O(1) time, we need to pre-compute
the identity of each log record and store it along with the logs. For
a 32-bit accumulator, we require 10 Bytes for each identity and
for the 64-bit the requirement is 20 Bytes. That means, for 10,000
records, we need 97.67 KBytes storage with the 32-bit accumulator
and 195.35 KBytes for the 64-bit accumulator. Hence, we get a
600% increase in storage in one year for the 32-bit accumulator
comparing with the 0.1% FP for 10,000 records. However, this extra
storage can provide us zero false positive probability. Therefore,
we need to choose whether we will go for accommodating higher
storage with the One-Way accumulator or tolerating a little false
positive probability with the Bloom filter. Moreover, the Bloom
filter will give us better performance in all the required tasks.
8. RELATED WORKS
As logging information is one of the prime needs in forensic
investigation, several researchers have explored this problem across
multiple dimensions. Marty proposed a log management solution,
which can solve several challenges of logging, discussed in Section 2
[21]. In his solution, after enabling logging on all infrastructure
components to collect logs, he proposed to establish a synchronized,
reliable, bandwidth efficient, and encrypted transport layer to trans-
fer log from the source to a central log collector. Final step deals
with ensuring the presence of the desired information in the logs.
The proposed guideline tells us to focus on when to log, what to
log, and how to log. The answer of when to log depends on the use-
cases, such that business relevant logging, operations based logging,
security (forensics) related logging, and regulatory and standards
mandates. At minimum, he suggested to log the time-stamps record,
application, user, session ID, severity, reason, and categorization,
so that we can get the answer of what, when, who, and why (4 W).
However, this work does not provide any solution for logging net-
work usage, file metadata, process usage, and many other important
sources of evidence.
As a solution of forensic investigation, Zafarullah et al. proposed
logging provided by OS and the security logs [32]. In order to
investigate the digital forensics in cloud, they set up cloud com-
puting environment using Eucalyptus. Using Snort, Syslog, Log
Analyzer (e.g., Sawmill), they were able to monitor the Eucalyptus
behaviour and log all internal and external interaction of Eucalyptus
components. For their experiment, they launched a DDoS attack
from two virtual machine and analyzed bandwidth usage log and
processor usage log to detect the DDoS attack. From the logs in
/var/eucalyptus/jetty-request-05-09-xx file on Cloud Controller (CC)
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machine, it is possible to identify the attacking machine IP, browser
type, and content requested. From these logs, it is also possible to de-
termine the total number of VMs controlled by a single Eucalyptus
user and the VMs communication patterns. Their experiment shows
that if the CSPs come forward to provide better logging mechanism,
cloud forensics will get a better advancement.
To make the network, process and access logs available to the
customer, Bark et al. proposed exposing read-only API by the
CSP [5]. By using these APIs, customer can provide valuable
information to investigator. In PaaS, customers have full control
on their application and can log variety of access information in a
configurable way. So for PaaS, they proposed a central log server,
where customer can store the log information. In order to protect
log data from possible eavesdropping and altering action, customers
can encrypt and sign the log data before sending it to the central
server. In the same context, Dykstra et al. recommended a cloud
management plane, for using in IaaS model [10]. From the console
panel, customers, as well as investigators can collect VM image,
network, process, database logs, and other digital evidence, which
cannot be collected in other ways.
Secure logging has been discussed in several research works [19,
1, 26]. However, none of these works focus on secure logging in
cloud environment, specially providing secure logging as a service.
Moreover, they did not consider the logger as dishonest. In the threat
model of current secure logging works, researchers consider attacks
on privacy and integrity from external entity. These works do not
consider collusion between different entities. The closest work that
we can relate to our work is a secure logging scheme proposed by
Yavuz et al., which provides public verifiability of audit logs for
distributed system [31]. Using their proposed scheme, time required
for logging and verification increase with the number of logs. On the
other hand, in our system, time required for log verification is almost
constant with number of logs using various types of accumulators.
The solution proposed by Marty provided a guideline for logging
criteria and answered some importation questions, e.g., what are the
information we need to log, how to log and when to log. Zafarullah
et al. showed that it is possible to collect necessary logs from cloud
infrastructure, while Bark et al. and Dykstra et al. proposed for
public API or management console to mitigate the challenges of log
acquisition. However, none of them proposed any scheme of storing
the logs in Cloud and making it available publicly in a secure way.
Dyskstra et al. mentioned that the management console requires an
extra level of trust and the same should hold for APIs. In this paper,
we took the first step towards providing a solution to mitigate these
challenges. Combining all the previous solutions and our scheme
will drive towards making the Cloud more forensics friendly.
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Logs from different sources, e.g., network, process, database are
a crucial source of evidence for forensics investigation. However,
collecting logs from cloud is challenging as we have very little
control over clouds compared to traditional computing systems.
Till now, investigators need to depend on the CSP to collect logs
of different sources. To make the situation even worse, there is
no way to verify whether the CSP is providing correct logs to the
investigators or the investigators presenting valid logs to the court.
Moreover, while providing the logs to the investigators, the CSPs
need to preserve the privacy of the cloud users. Unfortunately,
there has been no solution which can make the logs available to the
investigators and at the same time, can preserve the confidentiality
and integrity of the logs. In this paper, we proposed SecLaaS, which
can be the solution to store and provide logs for forensics purpose
securely. This scheme will allow the CSP to store the logs while
preserving the confidentiality of the cloud users. Additionally, an
auditor can check the integrity of the logs using the Proof of Past
Log PPL and the Log Chain LC. We ran our proposed solution on
OpenStack and found it practically feasible to integrate with the
cloud infrastructure.
Preserving the logs and the proofs of the logs will also increase the
auditability of cloud environment. Using our scheme, it is possible
to store and provide any types of logs from which we can get all
the activities of cloud users. Auditability is a vital issue to make
the cloud compliant with the regulatory acts, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOX) [9] or The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) [7]. Hence, implementing SecLaaS will make the
cloud more compliant with such regulations, leading to widespread
adoption of clouds by major businesses and healthcare organizations.
In future, we will integrate other logs besides the snort log with
our proof-of-concept application. Moreover, we will continue exper-
iment on different accumulators to find the best fitted accumulator
algorithm with SecLaaS. And finally, we will implement SecLaaS
as a module of OpenStack.
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